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abstract
The transformations undergone by research and science in the name of the so called “knowledge economy”
cover the decisions of scientific policies and the “management” of research, and also the meaning of
scientific activities (devoted to innovation) and even more fundamentally the very structure of the sci-
ences (transformed to technosciences). The science that is contributing to capitalist competitiveness
(and to the current economic crisis) is not the same as that which would be able to contribute “to the
conception and democratic carrying out of another form of globalization and another European project”.
However, this is not self-evident, and it needs to be thought about since it is not simply a matter of re-
turning to the science of the 20th century that opened the way to technoscience.
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Use of the expression “science and democracy” tends to be spreading. Its meaning,
consequently, is becoming polysemic. Is there, on the one hand, an eternal “science”
(more or less fantasized) and, on the other hand, a “democracy” that has to “adminis-
ter” that science with a view to “improving” it? Or, more fundamentally, should we not
be thinking in terms of the co-evolution of science and society? Addressing these ques-
tions must take into account that the present situation of science undoubtedly cannot
be understood outside of the ultraliberal, globalized and financialized stage of capital-
ist society in which it is developing. Thus, must not any project for democratization of
society involve in response – and be preceded by – an alteration of science, about which
it seems necessary to begin thinking now, so as to give it substance?
By using the term “economy and society of knowledge”, or simply “knowledge
economy”, neoliberal capitalism aims to recruit science behind its banner and make it
the pillar of economic war and competitiveness. In doing this, it had to transform West-
ern science to make it a key instrument for profit, consumerism, and the current eco-
nomic (and ecological) crisis. What is at stake are the scientific policies that give re-
search the role of supplying profit through what is called – without defining it –
innovation (cf. Jacq, 2011). These policies are set up both by the financing of research
and by its “management”, modeled on that of a firm (which introduces a high degree of
job insecurity for scientific workers). Thus research workers are asked, as a condition
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of receiving credits needed for pursuing their activity, how many patents they have filed,
and what are the innovations that they envisage resulting from the research project for
which they are asking subsidies. All this is beginning to be very well understood and
analyzed at length – and it is important to realize that it profoundly modifies the very
nature of research, the significance of science and the nature of scientific activity.1
The research being carried out today in public laboratories is not of the same kind as
that carried out around the middle of the 20th century. A fortiori, it is not the same kind
of research that contributes to capitalist competitiveness, and that will contribute to
(as put in the title of a forum during the Counter G20 in Nice, October 2011) “the con-
ception of the democratic setting up of another form of globalization”.
This means that there is no “essence of science”, not even in Western science.
Research is a social activity that obeys society’s imperatives through constraints that
can be described as epistemological (methods, material and conceptual tools, theo-
ries, dominant paradigms, and the existence of a real object for knowledge research)
and political (the research policy of the public and private institutions). Thus the modi-
fications imposed under the term “knowledge economy” have seen the transforma-
tion of research from an activity experienced (although in a partly mistaken manner)
as an autonomous activity to one primarily driven by profit. Two terms summarize the
way science has had to evolve to meet these imperatives: technoscience and innova-
tion. I will here use “technoscience” to describe these transformations, while being
aware of the misinterpretations to which this may lead. In no way am I proposing a
return to the oil lamp or denying the importance and impact of technologies in certain
disciplines and for a great deal of research, and I have the greatest respect for the tech-
nologies that have been able (and may yet be more able if better used) to improve hu-
man life and even human nature in depth.
Science in the second half of the 20th century was relatively ready for these trans-
formations as it was an essentially reductionist science, giving priority to the analysis
of increasingly small and dissociated parts thanks to increasingly sophisticated tech-
nologies. Thus, it often neglected the study of processes at all levels, taking into ac-
count their totality and dynamic movement. This has resulted in an extreme dividing
up of scientific disciplines into compartmentalized sub-disciplines, increasingly fo-
cused on techniques, which, with a little financial incentive, it was not too hard to re-
cruit under the banner of technoscience. By adding a career managed (in the name of
excellence) by the most rather than the best and a suffocating timetable, driven by the
1 For an analysis of the effects of the knowledge economy on life sciences, cf. Guespin & Jacq, 2006; Espaces Marx,
2007.
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necessity for always doing more while seeking funding, we very quickly end up by cre-
ating closeted research workers, no longer in their “ivory towers” but in their labora-
tory without the time or receptiveness to become citizens.
Everything is then ready for setting up structures to guide and manage research
that slip completely out of the control of the scientists. The latter put up with this in the
cause of the survival of research, even if this research no longer seems so much like
that for which the older ones had been using the term. As for the younger scientists,
they have not known anything else! Thus, even if there are still exceptions to the rule,
science has mainly the mission to contribute to innovation, competitiveness, economic
war and even financial profits; this latter contribution via the “économie de la promesse”
(cf. Jacq, 2009), by promising potential applications rather than obtaining real ones.
All of this is inexorably plunging the world into today’s crisis.
Is this the moment to make a distinction between the natural sciences and the
human sciences? No, because the latter are also threatened with extinction, as are all
areas that do not directly fit into the knowledge economy. All this has taken place in
barely a dozen years, throughout the world, in all the developed countries, even though
the rates and the methods used in the technoscientific transformation may have dif-
fered from one country to another. In Europe, the European Commission has set up a
European Research Area (ERA) to ensure the evolution of convergent scientific poli-
cies of all member countries (cf. Guespin & Jacq, 2006). However, Japanese and Aus-
tralian researchers tell the same story, the same transformations and the same suffer-
ing as well.
Evidently all this is not done without generating conflict and resistance. The many
trade union struggles fought out in France, for example, illustrate this well. These strug-
gles, however, are more over the methods of managing research and its financing than
over the nature of scientific activity or its meaning. However, it would be a dangerous
mistake for these resistance struggles to aim just for going back to the science of (let’s
say) the 1960s, the science that had been so easily transformed into technoscience.
It would also be a mistake to think that it would suffice simply to add democracy to
science such as it has now become, in order to reverse the situation.
My argument is that another science is needed rather than our present techno-
science. It needs to be a science that is different from that of the last century, so that it
may both have a place in an alternative society, and also contribute to the struggle to
overcome the crisis. This would initiate a virtuous circle! Ideas and experiments exist
already. Here, I want to stress the possibility and, indeed, the necessity of articulating
together the defensive struggles against subservience to the quest for profit, and creative
struggles to invent another kind or research – and to start organizing it immediately.
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Modern Western science developed around the idea of mastering nature. Other
forms of knowledge, of those called “native peoples” for example, are based on another
view of the world that includes humanity in nature. Does the idea of mastering nature
necessarily lead to the science we know? Or even to a single way of doing science, a
single paradigm that I have summarized here as technoscience? Or has not this idea
led, in the light of the climate crisis and world capitalism’s incapacity to deal with it, to
a situation in which there is currently more of a danger of nature’s mastery over hu-
manity? The idea advanced here is that features of science and society coincide, not
only their respective methods of management, but even features that are reflected in
the structure and character of science – in the questions its raises, in those that it con-
siders scientific or trivial in what Kuhn called the dominant paradigms (cf. Kuhn, 1970).
This in no way means that I deny the possibility of objective knowledge, or that I con-
sider that everything in science as it is today should be cast aside. Does this mean
retuning to a sort of latent Lysenkoism, a “proletarian (or democratic) science” as op-
posed to a “bourgeois science”?
It is a question that should not be dodged. In my opinion the philosopher Hugh
Lacey provides the best tools for dealing with this problem in making a distinction be-
tween impartiality and neutrality in science (cf. Lacey, 1999, 2005). What he calls im-
partiality covers the cognitive values that the scientific community recognizes as being
true (provisionally) such as theories or models or interpretations of facts. These val-
ues are independent of values in the moral sense. Radioactivity or genes are true how-
ever they are used and the quantum theory does not need the consent of public opinion
or the banks to be proved correct.2 On the other hand, Lacey observes, this does not
mean that science and scientists should be indifferent to the implications of their im-
partial work of inquiry, or that researchers should work without being responsible to
society for their activities. Research workers must be impartial but not neutral. Being
involved in the interactions between science and society does not simply mean being
aware of, or involved with, the applications of their research. This also covers the frame-
work in which the objectives of a research project are defined.
Lacey contrasts two major kinds of strategies (cf. Lacey, forthcoming; Lechopier,
2011). Decontextualized strategies are those in which the issues and type of pertinent
data are defined by solely focusing on those that are related to structures, processes
and underlying laws, of the phenomenon being investigated, thus enabling it to be ana-
lyzed and mastered. They are “decontextualized” since they explicitly disregard all the
context of actions, values, description and experiences in which the phenomenon stud-
2 It was by seeking to interfere at the level of impartiality in the name of alleged “dialectical laws” that Lysenko
turned his back on a proper scientific approach, and at the same time cast a lasting discredit on dialectical logic!
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ied lies. Reductionist approaches are, by definition decontextualized. As against this,
contextualized strategies embody, in the very construction of the research project, fac-
tors linked to the manner in which the phenomenon being studied is structured around
practices, how is part of the ecosystem, how it interrelates with the agents etc. The one
is no less scientific or less fundamental than the other. While both kinds of strategies
are necessary, present day science massively gives priority only to decontextualized
ones. On the other hand, it is at the level of contextualized strategies that new methods
and partnerships can be set up and that the concept of relations to society and democ-
racy takes a new meaning. This approach draws upon the contributions of complex
thought, since in both cases what is given priority is the plurality of approaches to ar-
rive at more complete knowledge, in contrast not only to present day science, but also
to that of the first half of the 20th century. Reductionism remains one of the scientific
methods, but should no longer be the “gold standard” of scientific culture.
One example should illustrate all of this: the selection of agricultural seeds.
Bonneuil and Thomas (2009) have shown that the majority of research in this field,
which appears to be decontextualized and focused on the properties of the seeds alone,
or even their genes, is in fact contextualized – and with a very precise perspective. The
contextualized factors taken into account are not those of agricultural practice, but the
dominant political and economic demands. Developing an agriculture that enables
increasing yields, reducing agricultural labour, creating a seed producing industry,
developing outlets for industry, meeting the expectations of millers and industrial bak-
ers. All these factors are totally integrated into the logic of public research, that works
in close cooperation with the selectors of seed varieties. These are very strong
contextualizing factors that determine the genetic criteria that are favored. It is they
that encourage the epistemic framework: Mendelian at first, then genetic and now
transgenetic, allowing varieties to be obtained that best correspond with the productivist
model being applied to agricultural production. This strategy, which is positioned im-
plicitly in the context of the capitalist economy, is very largely based on a sub-disci-
pline (plant genetics) and, to that extent, appears as decontextualized, this reinforcing
the idea that only decontextualized research can be scientific. For his part, Lacey (cf.
2005) studied the evaluation and selection of agricultural seeds in agroecological re-
search. There, the seeds are considered in the context of a system of food production.
This brings into play the sustainability of such production on economic, technical and
social levels (that is to say the impact on biodiversity, social relations and the land).
This strategy, clearly contextualized, requires the cooperation of a number of sub-dis-
ciplines and often implies a participative approach. Nevertheless, scientifically, both
research strategies contribute to the accumulation of knowledge about seeds – neither
is “more scientific” than the other.
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Thus questions arise about the criteria on which one strategy is chosen rather
than the other, and about the consequences of such a choice. However, we can observe
today that, in a science subjected to the knowledge economy, great efforts are made to
discredit – scientifically – the second kind of strategy, for reasons that are not scien-
tific but based on values, those of neoliberalism; and, in this way, the questions are
avoided. The hegemonic position of the decontextualized tradition (which, as we have
seen may not really be totally decontextualized) carefully conceals its contextualizing
factors. This reflects its mutual reinforcement with the values of a society based on
domination, which favors the solution of problems by technological innovations that
enable the massive exploitation of natural resources.
This example illustrates the interactions between choosing a strategy and choos-
ing a society. Democracy would thus involve allowing a plurality of approaches and strat-
egies (and not doing the opposite, that is, of solely favoring a single strategy). I have
lingered over this example to illustrate what I mean by the necessity of changing the
very structure of science. It can be seen, for example, that contextualized strategies
require a complete overhaul of the present pigeon-holing of disciplines. This involves
not only another way of carrying out research that is interdisciplinary and linked to
society, but also another way of teaching science. More fundamentally it also means
another way of thinking, in which reductionism and linear rationalism cease to be the
only key to rationality. Thus, thinking in terms of scientific activity in relation to the
problems of society can also lead to raising epistemological questions.
However, this is just an example, an illustration to open a field of research and
thought, and not a ready-made recipe. Talking about a plurality of approaches implies
the necessity for (or at least the possibility of) unceasingly seeking new approaches,
new strategies, and new frameworks for thought. This, however, does not mean allow-
ing anything to be done anyhow. The criteria for determining that research has a genu-
inely scientific character (impartiality) that makes sense of, for example, the peer evalu-
ation of a research, are still valid, provided that the criterion of subjection to some
paradigm or other, even the dominant one, is not (explicitly or implicitly) added.
Is it, then, possible and desirable and even necessary to tackle such a task now?
Possible yes, since the science of complex systems is beginning to introduce, in the
field of knowledge, precisely those concepts needed for thinking about a plurality of
research strategies. It is also possible because this plurality also covers the require-
ment of cooperation between scientists and many social actors and citizens, which is
coming into existence in society in reaction against the hegemony and ravages of
technoscience. Finally, possible since several examples already exist, and because life
is increasingly showing the limitations and even the damages caused by decontextua-
lized science, for example, in the case of bio-fuels.
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It is also desirable because, once again, today’s science will become of use to the
science of tomorrow, desirable because there is a mutual strengthening of the practice
and its acceptance in the minds of people. Since, for many scientists today (and above
all the young ones who have never known anything else), only decontextualized strate-
gies can be considered scientific, challenging this dogma is also to question the legiti-
macy of the society that imposes it.
Finally, it is necessary because contextualized strategies are the ones that enable
work between professional scientists and actors of “civil society”, joint work that may
enable better mutual understanding and may make more general the involvement of
citizens in the democratic management of choices of scientific policy. All those who
get involved in this kind of joint work know how difficult it can be. They have to deal
with the tendency of scientists (and many other citizens) to agree implicitly to make
science (and also scientific policy) an exclusive preserve that may wind up in the pock-
ets of the multinationals. Nevertheless, by beginning to work together now on certain
problems, even limited ones, citizen-scientists and citizens are preparing themselves
for democratic management of scientific policy.
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